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Abstract: 
 
This article begins by analysing critically the usefulness of the recent political 
philosophy of Chantal Mouffe for reconceptualising ideas of peace and conflict. It 
takes as its focus for doing so the situation of the Middle East. It proceeds to show 
how Mouffe’s radical democratic politics is actually just another form of the 
liberalism of Habermas and Rawls she positions her theory against. The essay then 
explores the potential digital media hold for making affirmative, affective, hyper-
political interventions in specific contents and singular situations. In particular, it 
advocates using the wiki medium  - hence the piece’s Wikipedia-like form - to 
experiment with new ways of organising institutions, cultures, communities and 
countries which do not uncritically repeat the reductive adherence to democracy, 
hegemony and Western, bourgeois, liberal humanism identified in Mouffe, but which 
can also be located in the institution of academic criticism more widely. ‘WikiNation’ 
is part of a series of ‘performative media’ projects. Performative media here stands for 
media that do not endeavour to represent the world so much as have an effect in or on 
it.  They are media which produce the things of which they speak, in other words, and 
which are engaged primarily in and through their actual performance. 
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On peace and conflict 
 
Those of us who write on cultural theory and cultural politics are frequently 
confronted by colleagues and students working in more empirically-oriented 
disciplines with challenges drawn from “real life.” Not surprisingly, one of the more 
regularly occurring of these in recent years has concerned the “war on terror,” the 
occupation of Iraq and the Israel/Palestine conflict. The following questions, 
differently phrased, are often posed: “How might the kind of analysis you have 
undertaken in your work - one which might be described as destabilizing the 
entrenched certainties of polar oppositions and endeavouring to develop an ethical 
response to the irreducible otherness of the other as well as to one's own alterity - 
help us to rethink ideas of peace and conflict? In particular, how it might do so in 
relation to a specific conflict-riven context?” This article is an attempt to develop the 
beginnings of one possible response to these frequently posed questions. It takes as its 
focus the Middle-East.  
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The 6-step programme 
 
The following is by now a tried and tested method for rethinking ideas of peace and 
conflict. It offers a simple yet effective treatment of the issues, using a set of 6 easy-
to-follow, step-by-step instructions:  
 
The 6-Step Programme 
 
Step 1  - show how any would-be unified self – be it an individual, a 
culture, a nation – can only establish and maintain its identity by 
distinguishing itself from and excluding that which it is not; 
 
Step 2  - demonstrate that any such self cannot be positioned in terms of 
a simple conflict or oppositional relationship with those identified as 
being “outside” and “other” to it; for at the same time as it rejects and 
condemns those others, it also needs them and their difference to 
establish and maintain its own identity; 
 
Step 3 - reveal that any such self depends upon and even contains many 
of the attributes it ascribes to its others; 
 
Step 4 - show that it is just another form of what it accuses those others 
of being; 
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Step 5 - argue that, rather than attempting to “de-other” itself by 
eliminating whatever its others represent, the prospective self-identical 
entity needs to recognise that this relation represents an internal 
dislocation. (In other words, the idea is for it to stop imagining itself as 
constituting some kind of integral totality while at the same time 
continually fearing its own immanent dissolution at the hands of its 
“others”);  
 
Step 6 - explain that, rather than representing a crisis or threat, this 
internally dislocated nature is just what it is: that any would-be unified 
self just is constitutively non-identical to itself; that this is what makes it 
possible (and of course impossible) in the first place.i  
 
Can such an approach be adopted with regard to the situation of the Middle 
East in order to help us address issues of peace and conflict there? The 
hypothesis or proposition I want to develop in this essay is that, to a certain 
extent, this somewhat formulaic-looking method can indeed be useful when 
dealing with the political complexities of the Middle East - although not in 
quite so straightforward a manner as the above “6-step programme” may 
suggest.  
 
But that is for later. At this point I want to move away from broad generalisations  as, 
despite the impression perhaps created by my somewhat playful opening, I do not 
want to imply that analyses conducted along these “self/other” lines are all the same. 
Indeed, this particular project on peace and conflict in the Middle East is driven by an 
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ethical injunction to retain a relation of infinite responsibility to an unconditional 
hospitality, no matter whether we are dealing with political events or political texts.ii 
For this reason I am going to focus in this essay on a specific instance of such an 
analysis: that provided by the political philosopher Chantal Mouffe - who is one of the 
most interesting contemporary theorists of the relation between peace and conflict - in 
her recent books The Democratic Paradox (2000) and, especially, On the Political 
(2005). 
 
 
On the political 
 
 
In keeping with the approach sketched above, Mouffe views the political in terms of a 
conflict and antagonism that is irreducible. Reading the philosopher Carl Schmitt 
against himself, Mouffe argues that the political “‘can be understood only in the 
context of the friend/enemy grouping’” (Schmitt 1976: 35; cited in Mouffe 2005: 11). 
“By showing that every consensus is based on acts of exclusion, [Schmitt] reveals the 
impossibility of a fully inclusive ‘rational’ consensus” (Mouffe 2005: 11). This is 
because of what Mouffe, following Jacques Derrida, calls the “‘constitutive outside,’” 
whereby, when it comes to the “field of collective identities, we are always dealing 
with the creation of a ‘we’ which can exist only by the demarcation of a “they”” 
(2005: 15): the ethnic minority, the immigrant, the asylum seeker, the religious or 
political extremist, the terrorist and so on. From this point of view we can never 
achieve peace: not internally within a culture or society; nor externally between 
different cultures and societies. Instead, we need to acknowledge the antagonistic 
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dimension that is “constitutive of ‘the political’” (2005: 2) and give up on the fantasy 
of ever arriving at a completely united and harmonious world in which all power, 
violence and sovereignty is eradicated.  
 
Now, it is important not to see the irreducibility of conflict as a purely negative thing, 
as it might be perceived, say, by liberal thought, which has as one of its central tenets 
“the rationalist belief in the availability of a universal consensus based on reason” 
(11). In fact, far from placing democracy at risk, a certain degree of confrontation 
constitutes the very possibility of its existence. As far as Mouffe is concerned, “a well 
functioning democracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic political positions” 
(30). It is thus far more dangerous not to acknowledge this irreducible antagonism, as 
this lack of acknowledgement leads to negative forms of conflict in the arenas of both 
domestic and international politics. Mouffe explains by referring to the various 
affective forces, which she calls “‘passions:’” i.e. those drives, desires and fantasies 
which make people want to become part of a crowd, group, community or nation and 
which form the basis of collective forms of identification. Unless these passions and 
the forms of conflict they give rise to have a legitimate democratic means of 
expressing themselves, there is a danger that a “confrontation between essentialist 
forms of identification or non-negotiable moral values” will take their place, with all 
the attendant negative consequences (30). For Mouffe, “democratic institutions can 
contribute to [the] disarming of the libidinal forces leading towards hostility which are 
always present in human societies” by providing positive channels for their expression 
(26).  
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From political to moral 
 
 
Mouffe’s emphasis on the constitutive nature of political conflict leads her to argue 
strongly against the post-political vision of the world that has been attributed to 
sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. Revising ideas of the “post-
industrial society” and the “end of ideology” from the 1960s, they argue that 
conceptions of politics built around shared, large-scale group identities have become 
irretrievably old-fashioned and outmoded. For Beck and Giddens, Western societies 
are currently experiencing a “’second modernity’ in which individuals liberated from 
collective ties can now dedicate themselves to cultivating a diversity of lifestyles, 
unhindered by antiquated attachments,” such as those associated with the ideological 
divisions of left and right (1). Liberal democracy has thus won out over communism, 
and consensus is held as being achievable now through dialogue rather than political 
conflict and antagonism.  
 
According to Mouffe, however, what we are seeing at the moment is not the 
“disappearance of the political in its adversarial dimension... What is happening is that 
nowadays the political is played out in the moral register” (5). So, to provide a few 
examples of my own, after the events of 9/11, North Korea, Iran and Iraq were 
notoriously positioned by George W. Bush in terms of an “axis of evil” (Bush 2002);  
an axis which was soon expanded to include Cuba, Libya and Syria.iii Similarly, in 
2002, Cherie Blair, the human rights lawyer and wife of the then British Prime 
Minster, was made to apologise for saying that “as long as young people [in Palestine] 
feel they have got no hope but to blow themselves up you are never going to make 
 10 
progress.”iv She had to apologise for saying this because nowadays people in her 
position are expected to condemn actions such as suicide bombing as morally wrong 
and thus incomprehensible to all right-minded people. What they are not expected to 
do is interpret them as a political issue, and hence understandable, as Cherie Blair did. 
The problem with this moralistic approach, however, is that no dialogue or discussion 
is possible with anything that is “evil.” Evil – as is clearly the case with regard to 
Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Saddam Hussein or Palestinian suicide bombers - just 
has to be condemned and destroyed. Yet not only does this playing out of the political 
in moral terms often lead those on the side of “good” to be just as violent as those 
they accuse of being morally wrong, it also results in that which is repressed returning 
in illegitimate, violent forms, since it has no legitimate outlet. 
 
 
On the Middle East 
 
 
Can an analysis such as that offered by Mouffe, and inspired by the philosophy of 
Jacques Derrida and Carl Schmitt, be adopted with regard to the Middle East, then? If 
conflict is constitutive of the political, surely one of the most interesting places to 
think about peace is somewhere in which the irreducibility of antagonism is extremely 
apparent. From this standpoint, rather than being a “backward region” not worth 
paying attention to because it is always locked in apparently unresolvable political 
turmoil – as a 2007 article in Prospect magazine indeed maintained (Luttwak 2007) – 
the fact that it is the scene of so much violence is precisely what makes the Middle 
East interesting and important when it comes to exploring how different people can 
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live together. Mouffe certainly raises a number of issues that are relevant to any 
understanding of peace and conflict in the region today.  
 
 
Terrorism  
 
 
For instance, we could use Mouffe’s argument to interpret events such as the 7/7 
bombings in London as the reactions of Islamic fundamentalists to the globalizing 
advance of Western, liberal democracy. From this perspective, terrorism is not simply 
the work of small-scale fanatical groups working in relative isolation. It is “the 
product of a new configuration of the political which is characteristic of the type of 
world order being implemented around the hegemony of a single hyper-power:” that 
of the US (Mouffe 2005: 81). In fact, as far as Mouffe is concerned, “the lack of 
political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of 
globalization is… at the origin of the proliferation of discourses and practices of 
radical negation of the established order” (82), among which we could presumably 
include the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan and all those events associated 
with the name al-Queida.  
 
 
Hrant Dink 
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Could we develop a similar analysis with regard to the murder in Istanbul early in 
2007 of the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink? Dink argued for 
“democratization in Turkey and focused on the issues of free speech, minority rights, 
civic rights and issues pertaining to the Armenian community.”v Was Dink killed 
because he was seen as being wrong in moral rather than political terms? Did the 
ultra-nationalist far right in Turkey perceive him as an evil enemy to be destroyed 
because they lack other channels for challenging the hegemony of the Western, liberal 
democratic model of globalization, channels that would have enabled them to see 
Dink instead as a political opponent?  
 
 
The question of Europe (and cosmopolitanism) 
 
 
Although Moufe does not of course mention either Bhutto or Dink (The Democratic 
Paradox and On the Political were published in 2000 and 2005 respectively), she 
nevertheless insists that it is a mistake to think neo-liberal globalisation can be best 
resisted on a nationalist or even national level. Instead, she argues for the creation of a 
strong political Europe, at least to counter the US and “oppose the violations of 
international law and human rights by the [then] Bush government” (2005: 129). But 
she is careful to emphasise that this should not be regarded as merely the first stage in 
the creation of a cosmopolitan world order based on the universalization of the 
European liberal democratic worldview: one which presents the latter as “the only just 
and legitimate regime, whose institutions would, in idealized conditions, be chosen by 
all rational individuals” (83); and anyone who does not choose it – those associated 
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with Islam, for instance - as irrational, uncivilised or morally and culturally backward. 
Too often the choice nations outside the West are faced with – especially when it 
comes to joining organisations such as the European Union - is that they can retain 
their traditional cultures, religions, and ways of life but then not take part in the 
economic modernization and prosperity associated with the West. Or they can join in 
with this so-called progressive modernization and reformation on the economic level, 
but then also have their traditional cultures, religions and ways of life transformed 
into a liberal, democratic, individualistic order. Consequently, rather than advocate 
cosmopolitanism, Mouffe argues for a multipolar world, with ideas, decisions and 
critiques being generated in a plurality of places: not just America or Europe but 
many different centres of power. One can easily imagine such centres or poles 
including the Middle East as well as South America (under the influence of Hugo 
Chavez perhaps?), China, East Asia, India… 
 
 
On the anti-political  
 
 
Mouffe’s analysis is no doubt useful with regard to some of the issues related to peace 
and conflict we might want to think about here. In particular, it enables us to 
understand that conflict in the Middle East is not natural, timeless and without 
foreseeable end; that the region cannot be positioned as a state of exception, “an 
included exclusion,” the role of which is to “preserve the conceptual and geographical 
borders, and thus the vitality, of the democratic polis” of the West (Zylinska 2009). 
The Middle East can only be viewed in this manner if history and politics (and indeed 
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biopolitics) are excluded from our reading of the situation. Instead, with Mouffe, we 
can see that conflict and antagonism are everywhere constitutive of the political and 
that they form an irreducible aspect of it. The point then is not to search for the 
complete resolution of all conflict and the associated reconciliation between the 
different conflicting parties (as that is impossible); nor to despair at and give up on 
those who fail to achieve this goal (it is impossible, after all); but rather to find more 
constructive ways of expressing such antagonism. 
 
Yet, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, adopting an approach of this kind is not what I 
want to suggest we do: partly for reasons that are specific to Mouffe’s analysis; but 
also for reasons that are applicable to this kind of theoretical approach more widely. 
The reasons that are specific to Mouffe concern the way in which her theory, for me, 
is not political. I would even go so far as to say it is anti-political.  
 
 
Antagonism vs. agonism 
 
 
The anti-political nature of her theory is apparent from her attempt to tame and 
domesticate the conflict and violence which, following Schmitt, she regards as 
inherent to the political. For Mouffe, the main question of democratic politics is not 
how to eliminate issues to do with power and conflict so that we end up in a state of 
perpetual peace, Kantian or otherwise. The question is rather: how can power and 
conflict assume a form that is compatible with democratic values? As far as she is 
concerned, a pluralist democracy can achieve this only through the establishment of a 
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set of institutions and practices by which domination and violence “can be limited and 
contested” (Mouffe 2000: 22). To this end Mouffe identifies two different forms in 
which antagonism can emerge: antagonism and what she calls agonism. “While 
antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share 
any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, 
although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, 
nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are “’adversaries’ not 
enemies,” she explains (2005: 20). We can now begin to think the problem of 
democratic politics somewhat differently, for from the viewpoint of “agonistic 
pluralism,” the goal of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism. 
In this way, Mouffe is able to produce an account of society that acknowledges the 
irreducibility of conflict and violence, but not to such an extent that it destroys any 
democratic political association.  
 
My concern, however, is that this leads her to offer a consensual vision of society that 
is almost as free from political conflict as that of the liberals she positions her theory 
against. For Mouffe is still drawing a line between those with whom “we have a 
shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy,” and those 
with whom we do not (2000: 102); between those we disagree with, but can 
nevertheless treat as legitimate opponents and so include within the democratic 
political association, and those we cannot treat as legitimate and who therefore remain 
enemies to be excluded.  
 
To argue that Mouffe is adopting the same strategy she criticises others for employing 
on the grounds that (1) it is impossible; (2) it denies the pluralism she regards as 
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constitutive of modern liberal democracy; (3) it implies the eradication of the political 
which has to do precisely with conflict and antagonism, would be to get a little ahead 
of ourselves, however. Mouffe’s political philosophy is not necessarily inconsistent 
on this point. For one thing, a certain amount of pluralism and conflict is still possible 
here: it has just been transformed from antagonism (which is illegitimate) into 
agonism (which is legitimate). For another, Mouffe has no problem with placing 
limits on pluralism or with the exclusion of what she considers to be illegitimate 
forms of politics – just so long as it is clear that this is a political decision, not an 
expression of a “universal morality” (2005: 121). In marked contrast to the liberalism 
of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, then, Mouffe does appear to be providing the 
basis for including the kind of conflict and pluralism over politics that might 
otherwise be considered to be eliminated from her philosophy. Witness the way she 
emphasises that “the drawing of the frontier between the legitimate and the 
illegitimate is always a political decision, and that it should therefore always remain 
open to contestation” (121). From this perspective, Mouffe has made a political 
decision in favour of the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy and against 
those who think differently enough to want to challenge these principles. She stresses, 
however, that, being political, this decision is an inherently violent one that always 
remains open to political conflict and contestation.   
 
My question is does it? For all that Mouffe emphasises the importance of making a 
political decision, it seems to me that some things are more open to contestation than 
others, and that a number of the decisions she makes actually do not remain open to 
challenge at all. Let me draw attention to what I consider to be three of the most 
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important of these: important, not just for Mouffe’s philosophy, but for the kind of 
analysis we might develop regarding peace and conflict.  
 
 
The others of democracy 
 
 
To begin with, let us consider Mouffe’s notion that other forms of sociality do not 
permit the kind of legitimation of conflict she ascribes to democracy. The reason 
Mouffe makes a political decision in favour of liberal democracy is because she 
regards the latter, for all its problems, as preferable to other forms of social 
organisation, such as fascism, totalitarianism, religious fundamentalism and so on, 
due to the fact that democracy recognises and permits a degree of antagonism. “What 
is specific and valuable about modern liberal democracy,” she writes, “is that… it 
creates a space in which… confrontation is kept open, power relations are always 
being put into question and no victory can be final” (2000: 15). Still, while it may be 
true that democracy does allow for conflict, and certain other forms of sociality 
including those associated with totalitarianism, fascism and religious fundamentalism 
do not, is that to say all other possible forms of sociality do not? Is this something that 
has been thoroughly and rigorously analysed and investigated? Or has it just been 
adopted nowadays as something of a philosophical and political truism? Is this 
decision on Mouffe’s part not based on precisely the kind of stereotypes - about 
democracy (that it does allow for political contestation), about other forms of sociality 
(that they do not), and about other forms of (non-democratic) conflict - that have been 
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used by some to justify the universalization of democracy as the “modern,” 
“progressive” way to go? 
 
 
Democracy 
 
 
The second of Mouffe’s uncontestable decisions concerns democracy itself.  For 
Mouffe, there can be conflict within democracy over the way “the institutions 
constitutive of the democratic political association” are to be interpreted, but not over 
the continuing existence of those democratic institutions in some shape or form. In 
other words, the nature of those institutions can be contested; what cannot be 
contested is the shared symbolic space - i.e. democracy - that is necessary for that 
contestation to take place. The democratic system cannot be replaced by a communist 
one, for example.  
 
Something similar happens on the international plane. Here “different vernacular 
models of democracy” from that of the Western liberal version are perfectly 
acceptable, and are even to be encouraged (2005: 129). Yet for all her talk of the 
dangers of the universalization of the Western or European cosmopolitan world-view, 
and of the need for the development of a multipolar world to counter this, Mouffe is 
still quite happy to universalize democracy, as these all have to be models of 
democracy of some kind. While the nature of particular forms of democracy can be 
challenged, then - which means Islamic countries, say, do not necessarily have to 
adopt the Western liberal model - what cannot be challenged is democracy itself.  
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I should just stress, I am saying this not because I suffer from what has been described 
as a “hatred of democracy” (Rancière 2006). I am not maintaining that a political 
decision cannot be taken to the effect that democracy is the best - or at any rate least 
worst - system to adopt in a given situation. (I can appreciate that democracy must be 
particularly attractive in circumstances such as those experienced in Turkey recently – 
to provide just one example relating to the Middle East - when the military again, as 
they have so many times before, threatened to get involved in the running of civil 
society.)vi What it is to say is that, if the political for Mouffe is a decision taken in an 
undecidable terrain, which it is, then such a political decision is not available to be 
taken in her work, not regarding democracy anyway (2000: 130).  
 
 
Hegemony 
 
 
This brings me to the third of Mouffe’s unchallengable decisions: that politics is 
always hegemonic. Quite simply, for her “there is no ‘beyond hegemony’” (2005: 
118). “Every order is by necessity a hegemonic order” (106).  
 
Now I would agree that political antagonism is “ineradicable” - to the extent that we 
should not be searching for complete reconciliation between the various conflicting 
parties in the Middle East. But does that mean politics always takes a hegemonic 
form? After all, hegemony is not universal: it is a specific form of politics.vii What is 
more, I would maintain this is the case with respect to both of the main senses in 
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which hegemony is usually understood. It is the case in the sense in which hegemony 
refers to the leadership or dominance of one class or group over another: not every 
political struggle is necessarily a struggle for this kind of leadership or dominance. 
But it is also the case with regard to the understanding of hegemony as a generalised 
political logic. From this perspective, a society can only institute itself by virtue of its 
relation to that which exists outside and in excess of it. As a consequence, its identity 
is constitutively marked by non-closure: it can never achieve absolute unity and 
stability. It is here that the theory of hegemony understood as a generalised political 
logic comes into play. For although this instability can never be entirely overcome, 
hegemony consists of the attempt to provide social relations with a temporary degree 
of closure, stability, unity and meaning by way of an act of articulation of this excess 
of the social. (Which is how a “‘we’ that can exist only by the demarcation of a 
‘they’” is established and maintained.) This is why every social order is hegemonic in 
nature, for Mouffe; why there is no going beyond hegemony: because “power 
relations are constitutive of the social” (2005: 106). So even a socialist or communist 
society would not be free of hegemony in this sense. It is also why the political, for 
Mouffe, is a decision taken in an undecidable terrain: because such social relations are 
not fixed or natural, the result of objective and immutable economic or historical 
processes and practices. Instead, they are the product of continual, precarious, 
hegemonic politico-economic articulations: i.e. of contingent, pragmatic yet 
temporary decisions involving power, conflict and violence. The latter of course 
brings with it the advantage that there is the potential for these articulations to be 
“disarticulated and transformed” as a result of struggle between the agonistic 
adversaries and a new form of hegemony established (33). But can politics really only 
be thought in terms of a universal drive for unified identity, however unrealisable it 
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ultimately may be? Must all politics inevitably be about instituting the social field? 
Are there not other ways of being political which do not require hegemonic 
articulation?  
 
Interestingly, Mouffe positions her 1985 book co-written with Ernesto Laclau, 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, as having acknowledged “that politics is now 
taking place in a multiplicity of domains hitherto considered as non-political” (2005: 
53). Similarly in On the Political she maintains that the striated nature of the 
“globalized space,” in which there are a multiplicity of “sites where relations of power 
are articulated in specific local, regional and national configurations,” means that 
what is required is a “variety of strategies” and resistances (2005: 114). Mouffe is thus 
clearly in favour of “enlarging the domain of politics” (53). Just not so much to be 
capable – even potentially - of making a political decision in favour of struggles 
which cannot be apprehended through the category of hegemony, it seems. All these 
different resistances still need to be organised into a “chain of equivalence,” with a 
view to constructing a new hegemony (53). 
 
 
Mouffe as an anti-political liberal (and not all that pluralistic either)… 
 
 
The above statement regarding hegemony does not mean I agree with Beck and 
Giddens that we have entered a “post-political” era; that I consider viewing politics in 
terms of hegemony to be completely out of date; or that, as far as I am concerned, we 
are now living in a post-hegemonic world. Again, I am not maintaining that a 
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responsible decision cannot ever be taken to the effect that hegemony is an 
appropriate concept to use when attempting to understand, analyse and resist a 
particular situation; nor that we should never attempt to create a chain of equivalence 
among political struggles. Far from it. I am just drawing attention to the fact that 
Mouffe has a transcendentalized and festishized notion of hegemonic politics which is 
in her own terms universally moralizing and anti-political, as she does not appear to 
be willing to make an actual political decision about any of this. Not one that remains 
open both to contestation and to the actual complexities of a given social or cultural 
situation: to the incalculable, the other, the undecidable, and especially to the 
possibility that politics may not always appear as she presents it. As a result, I would 
argue that Mouffe’s theory of politics is not political even according to her own 
criteria. What is more, it is not all that pluralistic either, since she is clearly leaving 
little room here for political positions that conflict with her own.  
 
In fact the whole thrust of Mouffe's politics is to establish a democratic society that 
will allow for agonism, but not “antagonism properly speaking.”As I explained above, 
she can only do this, firstly, by distinguishing between antagonism and agonism; and 
then, secondly, by excluding or marginalizing antagonism - that which she cannot 
tame or transform into agonism, and which therefore really is conflicting with her 
own values - outside this (radical) democratic realm. Of course, aware that there is a 
danger here of excluding political confrontation and conflict to a constitutive outside 
of her own making in an attempt to eradicate it from democratic society and thereby 
maintain a degree of relative peacefulness and reconciliation, Mouffe stresses, as we 
have seen, that “the drawing of the frontier between the legitimate and the illegitimate 
is always a political decision, and that it should therefore always remain open to 
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contestation” (2005: 121). However, as we have also seen, the decision as to what 
forms of conflict to consider legitimate and therefore include in democratic society 
and what to consider illegitimate and therefore exclude is in actual fact not always 
kept open to conflict and contestation by Mouffe. On the contrary, this decision is 
foreclosed, certainly when it comes to democracy and hegemony. Like the liberals she 
criticizes, Mouffe too, it seems, cannot envisage political conflict, antagonism and 
pluralism within democratic society. Ironically, Mouffe’s political philosophy thus 
turns out to be another form of the liberalism she positions her theory against. 
 
 
… Western, American and bourgeois 
 
 
This brings me to the more general reasons I want to suggest we do not simply adopt 
an analysis along these “self/other,” “we/they” lines. For, put very briefly, Mouffe’s 
adherence to the 6-step programme I outlined at the beginning of this essay means her 
political philosophy is all too easily incorporated into those “modernist,” “liberal” and 
“American” ways of thinking Timothy Clark has recently identified as being built into 
the institution of academic criticism. As Clark shows, the problem with these ways of 
thinking, for all that they are more or less ubiquitous in literary and cultural theory, is 
that they tend to be:  
 
a. Reductive - in that they have at their foundation one unacknowledged but “all-
determining norm:” that there is a natural desire for a certain kind of identity, “one 
whose self-realisation” is aggressive “assertion against others” (Clark 2005: 22). 
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We can clearly see this in Mouffe and her reliance on the notion of the  
“‘constitutive outside’” (2005: 15). 
 
b. Insufficiently critical - for example, the assumption that there is a universal drive 
for unified identity is never interrogated. So while Mouffe may part company with 
Schmitt on his notion that “there is no place for pluralism inside a democratic 
political community,” and that democracy instead “requires existence of a 
homogenous demos” (2005: 14), she nevertheless adheres and leaves 
unquestioned his notion that political identities consist and emerge out of the 
we/they relation. 
 
c. Liberal - underpinned as they are by notions of sovereign, unified identity and 
subjectivity, such apparently “radical” critical projects therefore effectively 
reiterate the very terms of the bourgeois, liberal, humanist discourse they are 
attempting to place in question.  
 
 
 
Performative media 
 
 
On historical movements, moments, eras, trends and turns 
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Having said all that, I am not advocating we should now turn our backs on that 
tradition of thought which has concerned itself with the study of various attempts to 
establish identity through aggressive self-assertion against others. It is a tradition 
which, for me, has been, and very much continues to be, incredibly interesting and 
important. So none of this is about dividing the history of thought into historical 
movements, moments, trends or turns: from hegemony to post-hegemony; culture to 
complexity; ideology to affect; representation to flows; or language and textuality to 
science and materiality. Nor is it about, say, Bergson, Badiou, Deleuze and Latour 
somehow superseding Heidegger, Barthes, Derrida and Lacan. We need to be more 
generous, hospitable, rigorous and responsible than that. My argument concerns more 
the manner in which this tradition – which includes not just Mouffe and Heidegger et 
al, but also Agamben, Spivak, Bhabha, Said, Foucault, Fanon and Sartre, stretching at 
least as far back as Freud and Hegel - has often been taken up: the way analyses of 
this kind have become something of a programme (which is of course what I was 
trying to draw attention to with my “6-step” opening), and in the process have been 
too easily incorporated into uncritical, reductive, liberal and American ways of 
thinking, closing “off the force of debate and contestation,” and severely reducing the 
complexity that is intrinsic to situations such as that of the Middle East and indeed 
Europe (Clark 2005: 27).  
 
 
Thinking Schmitt against Schmitt, Mouffe against Mouffe 
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For instance, it is not hard to understand why Mouffe has to foreclose the decisions I 
detailed above. If she did not, the antagonistic values she tries to exclude would 
threaten to bring into question the very concepts of democracy and hegemony she is 
anxious to defend. Nevertheless, what for me is so interesting about Mouffe’s 
philosophy is how at the same time it also shows us that “bringing a deliberation to a 
close always results from a decision which excludes other possibilities and for which 
one should never refuse to bear responsibility by invoking the commands of general 
rules or principles” (2000: 105) – a state of affairs which would presumably include 
her own general principles regarding agonistic pluralism, liberal democracy, and 
hegemony.  Instead, such a political decision has to be taken in relation to “specific 
practices” in “particular contexts” (2005: 121). It is also one that has to remain open 
to political conflict and contestation. 
 
From this point of view, the question Mouffe’s work pushes us to ask – even if she is 
not willing or able to raise it herself - is that, if we really want to be political, do we 
not have to take the risk of remaining open to those who are different, those with 
whom we do not “have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy,” and whom we cannot necessarily treat as legitimate political 
adversaries? We cannot decide against them always and forever, by invoking general 
rules or principles in advance:  
 
a. because that would not be to take a decision in an undecidable terrain, and so 
would not be political; 
b. because a specific practice or particular context may arise where we need to take a 
decision in favour of such different politics and antagonistic “enemies.”  
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To be sure, doing so might risk challenging many of our own strongly held ideas – 
including those of democracy, and of hegemony. But what Mouffe shows – and I am 
thinking with Mouffe against Mouffe here, just as she thinks Schmitt against Schmitt 
- is that this is precisely the point. If the political is a decision taken in an undecidable 
terrain, then it must involve remaining open to the possibility of bringing even our 
ideas of democracy and hegemony into question.  
 
 
Creating, inventing, experimenting 
 
 
What this means is that, in order to be political, we need to be committed to both 
politics and what I elsewhere call - partly following Mouffe in doing so – 
hyperpolitics (Hall 2008b). The latter names, for me, a refusal to consider the question 
of politics as closed or decided in advance, and an associated willingness to open up 
an unconditional space for thinking about politics and the political beyond the way in 
which they have been traditionally conceived – a thinking of politics which is more 
than politics, while still being political. This in turn means not just producing yet 
another analysis or critique of the politics of others. Of course we have to do this, 
since without rigorous analysis we risk uncritically repeating the adherence to 
democracy and hegemony and bourgeois liberal humanism I have identified in 
Mouffe, and which can be located in academic criticism more widely. So we can not 
just shift the balance away from critique and onto “affirmative” methods (Massumi 
2002: 17). (Which is why I have spent so long carefully working through Mouffe’s 
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political philosophy here.) But along with critique we also have to be prepared to go 
beyond what can be discerned and predicted by means of analysis. For we can now 
see that what it means to be political is not something that can, on the basis of either 
my own philosophy, or that of others, be decided once and for all a priori by means of 
analysis. Politics is not merely about the kind of intended consequences and affects 
that can be predicted, foreseen and articulated in advance. Politics is also something 
that has to be invented and created in relation to specific practices, in particular 
situations and contexts, by performing the associated decisions, and otherwise doing 
things that may be unanticipated and unpredictable, and thus beyond analysis.  
 
 
country x 
 
 
It is opportunities for doing this - for making affirmative, performative, affective 
political interventions by using media, both “old” and “new,” but especially “new,” to 
create singular situations in which people are required to take responsible political 
decisions - that I have been experimenting with in recent years in my own work. 
Examples include country x, which was a short-lived creative collaboration between 
the musician Matthew Herbert, Robert Smith and myself. We took our cue for country 
x from the way in which, by their “nation building” in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush and 
Blair showed what many philosophers and political theorists have argued for a long 
time now: that nations are not fixed or natural, but can be constructed and invented. 
So in 2006 we devised a project to explore the possibility of creating a new concept 
for a country, one which owed its heterogeneous emergence to a widespread 
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dissatisfaction with the politics, policies, borders and conflicts of the existing nation 
states. For example, while country x did not have an identity based on a particular 
geographical location or common history, what it did have was an unlimited 
immigration and emigration policy. We made a decision that anyone, anywhere, could 
become a citizen of country x irrespective of gender, religion, race, ethnicity, age, 
health, family history, social background, education, income, credit rating, 
employment status…viii 
 
 
Hyper-Cyprus  
 
 
Could we do something similar with regard to the Middle East? Could we use some of 
what I have said about peace and conflict to do more than just generate still further 
analyses and critiques of the relationships between East and West, Islam and 
Christianity, Arab and Jew, religious and secular, traditional and modern, past and 
present? Could we also begin to work co-operatively and affirmatively to invent ways 
of organising institutions, cultures, communities, countries, in all their complexity, 
uncertainty and multiplicity, which do not just repeat the anti-political reductionism, 
lack of criticality and Western, bourgeois, liberal humanism we have seen to be a 
feature of other accounts of the relation between self and other?  What if we were to 
devise our own community or country as a way of creating an actual, affective point 
of potentiality and transformation - not least in order to counter (in however minor a 
fashion) the hyper-power of Western liberal democracy?  
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A Hyper-Cyprus, if you like!  
 
Why Cyprus rather than anywhere else? For one thing, the Middle East is not all the 
same. And while the situation of the multicultural but divided island of Cyprus is a 
singular one for many reasons, it is nevertheless a particularly interesting and 
appropriate place from which to address issues of this kind, given Cyprus has formed 
a part,  sometimes an extremely important part,  of so many Empires - Greek, Persian, 
Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, British - all of which have left their traces to produce a 
multiple, hybrid culture.ix Divided – very literally, physically and visibly - between 
North and South, could we not say that Cyprus occupies a strategic place, 
geopolitically and otherwise, not just between Turkey and Greece, but also between 
Asia and Europe, East and West, not to mention the Islamic and Christian, religious 
and secular worlds? Although there are of course others, including Israel/Palestine, or 
the city of Istanbul, which for many  is located on a similar frontier or fault-line, 
would Cyprus not be a particularly suitable place from which to begin to address 
issues of this kind? 
 
 
Wikimedia 
 
 
To make it possible for us to begin experimenting along these lines I have set up a 
wiki. It is available at: 
 
http://hyper-cyprus.pbwiki.com 
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This wiki consists of material any visitor to the site is free to add to, edit, delete, and 
creatively remix, reconstruct and reinvent however they see fit. (Basically, it works 
more or less like Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org), except it is designed as a way to 
experiment with generating different notions of culture, community, the nation, etc. 
rather than as a free encyclopaedia).   
 
It is important that we should use digital media in our efforts to think the political 
otherwise, I think. In his book Imagined Communities (1983), Benedict Anderson 
showed how modes of communication are central to ideas of the nation, and how 
writing in particular was central to the formation of the modern nation. But if that 
mode of communication begins to change - from writing on paper to the use of digital 
technology, say - does this not offer us a chance to raise some important questions 
regarding how the modern nation is conceived, and to begin to think the nation 
differently, and reimagine and reinvent it? 
 
It is also important that, within this, we should use the wiki medium of 
communication specifically. For this particular medium enables us to experiment with 
ideas that are: 
 
• “User-generated” – so everyone with access to the internet and a personal 
computer will be able to contribute to this “nation” and directly participate in its 
organisation and running. 
• Distributed in structure – its use of “open editing” and “free content” means that 
this Hyper-Cyprus or WikiNation will have no one point of authorial or editorial 
control. 
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• Not limited by geographical, cultural or national boundaries – instead this 
WikiNation will  have the potential to be inter- and trans-nationally inclusive, 
even global in scope if we wish.  
• Continually in process – identity here will not be a given. It will not be fixed and 
unified (as if that was ever possible). This “community” or “country” or 
“collectivity” will rather be a (per)formative practice, something that is created 
and formed. It will thus be very visibly unstable, fluid, emergent; constantly in the 
making and in the process of becoming-other. 
• Highly responsive – this WikiNation will be able to respond quickly to 
citizens’/users’ demands: for new features, institutions, philosophies and so forth.  
 
As such, the wiki medium of communication can perhaps help us avoid simply 
repeating the Western, liberal models of culture, community, the nation and indeed 
academic work and the institution of academic criticism. It can do so by virtue of the 
way in which the project’s wikimedia form means that this community will not be: 
 
a. Simply made up of the contributions of autonomous, unified, sovereign, 
individualistic (neo)liberal subjects. Admittedly, this emphasis on my part on the 
wikimedia medium of communication could be taken as an attempt merely to be 
in tune with the current zeitgeist. However, whereas a lot of “Web 2.0” such as the 
social networking of MySpace and Facebook is very humanist and individualistic 
(and some would say neoliberal) (Kleiner & Wyrick 2007; Hodgkinson 2008), 
even in its very relational connectedness, wikis often tend to be the product of 
groups or networks of people it is difficult to give a fixed or unified identity to, 
but who are nevertheless working co-operatively, collaboratively and frequently 
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anonymously (to the user at least) to produce hard-to-recreate resources for free. 
This is what, to my mind, is so interesting about the wiki medium specifically. As 
the example of Wikipedia illustrates, by harnessing collective intelligence and “the 
power of the crowd” – what is sometimes called “crowdsourcing”  or in an 
academic context ‘social scholarship’ - – the wiki medium has at least the 
potential to develop  different models of social organisation, certainly to that of 
neo-liberal global capitalism; models which offer ways of thinking individuality 
and collectivity, singularity and commonality together. 
 
b. Owned and controlled by a limited number of authors, editors, publishers or 
institutions. Instead, “producers” are creating the basic idea and framework and 
then gifting it to everyone else, on the basis of the principles of open access and 
free content, to build upon and develop.  
 
c. Finished or even finishable – rather this “nation” will be constantly edited, added 
to, up-dated, revised, re-worked. Along with b. (above), this will assist us in 
keeping it open to continual political difference, conflict and contestation. 
 
d. Single, centralised or unified  – instead its networked, distributed structure means 
anyone, anywhere, can potentially join in, publish and participate. It therefore has 
the capacity to be extremely pluralistic. We could even have a multi-locational, 
multi-polar institution, community or country, if we wish. 
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University-generated media  
 
 
In view of the above I do not want to be prescriptive and establish a set of rules, 
norms, principles or procedures for any such new community. I do not even want to 
designate what we should call it. I have provisionally referred to it here as “Hyper-
Cyprus” or “WikiNation,” but we can think of myriad other names.x Perhaps we 
would not want it to assume the conventional form of a nation or country, with all that 
implies (i.e. that it is confined to a particular national territory, geographical location, 
social demographic, common identity, history, language, race, ethnicity, religion, 
ancestry or system of beliefs). That would possibly be too limiting; would involve 
replicating many features and attributes associated with the “nation” that we might 
otherwise want to place in question; and would besides risk restricting any such 
potential community primarily to those with a specific interest in that territory or 
location and so forth: i.e. Cyprus, the Middle East, Europe, the West. (In the case of 
Cyprus, in particular, there might also be a danger of it degenerating into the sort of 
polarised exchanges that have characterised discussions of the “Cyprus problem” 
elsewhere on the web.) 
 
One thing that is certain about any such emergent community is that it is not 
something I can simply tell you about in this essay and show you how it works. It is 
something that has be invented and created; and by more people than just one single 
author. However, just to get the experiment started, I have placed in the wiki an initial 
proposal – in the form of a mission statement - for a new kind of university that could 
perhaps be part of any reconceived “nation.” (Everyone is free to add to, edit, delete, 
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distribute and mash-up this text however they wish, too.)xi  I wanted to begin with a 
mission statement for the university partly because of the central role the university 
plays in global capitalism’s knowledge economy;xii and partly to show that I am not 
advocating any kind of libertarianism. (We do need institutions, or even states, which 
is perhaps another reason for starting from a specific situation and context such as that 
of Cyprus.) But also because the university is a place where most people who raise 
questions like those with which I began - and who are therefore likely to read this 
response on my part - work or study. It therefore seemed to me to be an appropriate 
place, strategically, to try to begin affirmatively reimagining our ideas of politics and 
the political – and with them of peace and conflict. 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
i For one analysis along these lines, see Hall (2008a). 
 
ii For more, see Hall (2008b). 
 
iii  See “US Expands “Axis of Evil.” BBC News, 6 May, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1971852.stm (accessed 12 April, 2007). 
 
 
iv See “PM’s Wife ‘Sorry’ in Suicide Bomb Row,” BBC News: World Edition, 18 
June, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2051372.stm 
(accessed 12 April, 2007). 
 
 
v See “Hrant Dink,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrant_Dink (accessed 30 
March, 2007). 
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vi I am not going to detail them here, but for a succinct English language journalistic 
account of these events, see “The Battle for Turkey’s Soul,” The Economist, 5 May, 
2007: 9. 
 
vii See Grossberg, (2005, 357); Hall (2008b), especially chapter 4: ‘Anti-politics and 
the Internet’.  
viii While the initial country x was relatively short-lived, the experiment was 
reactivated by Matthew Herbert in 2008. Country x is available at  
http://www.countryx.org/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page (accessed 19 May, 2008). 
 
ix A powerful visual mapping of the history of empires in the Middle East is available 
at http://www.mapsofwar.com/ind/imperial-history.html (accessed 24 June, 2007). 
 
x I am aware that there are already one or two projects in various states of 
development operating under the latter name on the web. However, they are 
invariably attempts to reproduce Western, liberal models of democracy, albeit by 
overcoming perceived problems in its already existing forms. 
 
xi I have  also placed an earlier, wikified version of this text in there, subject to the 
same free content conditions.  
 
This is one of the reasons I have given this essay something of the form of a 
Wikipedia entry, replete with an opening list of contents. 
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xii This is no doubt one explanation as to why there are a lot of emergent projects at 
the moment experimenting with new media to rethink the university. These include 
the edu-factory collective (available www.edu-factory.org, accessed 1 November, 
2007); the Experimental University (see “From Knowledge of Self-Management to 
the Self-Management of Knowledge,” translated by Maribel Casas-Cortés and 
Sebastian Cobarrubias, available  
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0707/catedraexperimental/en/print, accessed 1 November, 
2007); the Network for Self-Education (available 
http://p2pfoundation.net/Network_for_Self-Education, accessed 1 November, 2007); 
and Uniriot (available www.uniriot.org). For more see the Publiversity blog (available 
http://publiversity.wordpress.com, accessed 30 November, 2007). This contains an 
extensive list of experiments with new ways of conceptualizing the 
university as an institution. 
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